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branch of government. The test should focus on the nature of the al-
leged conspirators' acts—whether there was a genuine exercise of
First Amendment rights or political activity. This in turn may be
judged only in the context of the type of government
function—political or adjudicative—sought to be influenced. The
sham exception should be broad enough to allow an examination of
the alleged political activity and exercise of the right to petition in
order to determine whether the intent of the parties was to influence
governmental action, or whether it was to injure the competitor di-
rectly through an abuse of governmental function. The former is pro-
tected public activity; the latter essentially unprotected private action.
The mere presence of government in the picture cannot end the
inquiry. The wide-ranging involvement of "governmental units" in
business-related activities suggests that in order for the policies of the
antitrust laws to be effectuated, the Noerr doctrine must be defined
more clearly; it is political activity and First Amendment rights which
are to be protected, not anti-competitive business activity.'" At the
same time, acts such as bribery should never be immune under Noerr,
as they are not protected political activity or exercise of First Amend-
ment rights.
Unfortunately, Metro Cable is less than instructive in this confus-
ing area. The court did not read plaintiffs complaint as alleging a
bribe and thus avoided reaching any conclusion as to whether the
presence of an official co-conspirator—as an abuse of governmental
process—would remove Noerr protection. The court merely held that
"campaign contributions" did not make the mayor and alderman co-
conspirators. It is thus still an open question whether the presence of
an official co-conspirator would remove the Noerr protection."a
STEPHEN R. LAMSON
Labor—Effect of Negotiating Impasse on an Employer's Right to
Withdraw From a Multi-Employer Bargaining Association—NLRB v.
Beck Engraving Co.' — Respondent, Beck Engraving Company, was a
member of the Allied Printing Employer's Association (the Associa-
tion), 2 a multi-employer bargaining unit. As an Association member.
" 2 See Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
"" Metro did not apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. In fact, an
attorney for Metro, when queried, stated that the case had been dropped. Conversation
with Richard M. Calkins, Burditt & Calkins, Chicago, III., March 23, 1976. CATV, on
the other hand, is required by the FCC to come into compliance with federal regula-
tions by 1977. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 38 F.C.C. 2d lO, 14-15 (1972), petition for recon-
sideration denied, 40 F.C.C. 2d 493 (1973). It is possible that Metro may be awaiting a
failure by CATV to comply before renewing its challenge.
522 F.2d 475, 90 L.R.R.M. 2089 (3d Cir. 1975).
2 1d. at 477, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2090.
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Beck had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Assist-
ants and Offset Workers' Local 4 (the Union) which was due to expire
on April 30, 1973. 3 In anticipation of the expiration, the Union and
the Association began negotiations on February 28, 1973 for a new
agreement and continued regular negotiations after the contract
expired in April. 4
During the first week of June, the Union instituted selective
strikes against Beck and four other employer members of the
Association. 9 That same week one of the employer members withdrew
from the bargaining unit, with the mutual consent of the Association
and the Union." Negotiations continued through the rest of June and
into July. However, on July 13 and 14, Beck's six union employees,
under no pressure from respondent, resigned from the Union, termi-
nated their participation in the strike, and returned to work.' Subse-
quently, Beck informed the Union and the Association of its with-
drawal from the Association. 9
 Two days later, the Union and the As-
sociation reached an agreement, and the Union, asserting that it
neither consented to Beck's withdrawal nor considered it timely
sought Beck's execution of the new contract. 9 When Beck refused to
sign the agreement, the Union initiated proceedings before the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (the Board) alleging violations of section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)."
The Board held that Beck had violated the Act," basing its hold-
ing on the rules governing withdrawal fro'm a multi-employer bargain-
ing unit set forth in Retail Associates, Inc." Under the Retail Associates
rules, withdrawal by an individual employer prior to the start of
negotiations is allowed only if adequate written notice is given." Once
negotiations begin, however, abandonment is allowed only in cases of
mutual consent or "unusual circumstances."" Since negotiations in the
present case had begun and since mutual consent was absent, Beck
had to show an "unusual circumstance" to justify its withdrawal. Beck
asserted that (1) the resignation of its employees from the Union, (2)
the consent by the Union to the withdrawal of another member of the
Id.
' Id. at 477-78, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2090.
' Id. at 478, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2090.
6 1d.
Id. at 478 & n.6, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2090 & n.6.
'Id. at 478, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2090.
9 Id.
"NLRA §§ 8(a)(1), (5), 29 U.S.C. §§ I 58(a)(1), (5) (1970), which provide:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employers in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this tide; ...
(2) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
" Beck Engraving Co., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 87 L.R.R.M. 1037, 1038-39 (1974).
" 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 42 L.R.R.M. 119 (1958).
"Id. at 395, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1121.
"Id.
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unit, and (3) the instigation of the selective strike by the Union against
Beck, represented "unusual circumstances."' 5 Rejecting these facts as
insufficient, the Board ordered Beck to accept and sign the
agreement." On a motion for reconsideration of the Board's decision,
Beck argued that the parties had reached a bargaining impasse, and
that this impasse constituted an "unusual circumstance" justifying
withdrawal from the unit." The Board disagreed and denied the mo-
tion for reconsideration."
The Board sought enforcement of its order pursuant to section
10(e) of the Act." The Third Circuit denied enforcement and HELD:
A negotiating impasse between a multi-employer bargaining associa-
tion and a union justifies unilateral withdrawal by an employer
member from the multi-employer bargaining unit." The court noted
a Board-sanctioned, economic weapon in the union's ability to
negotiate interim agreements with individual employer members of a
multi-employer unit. 2 ' The court believed that this ability effectively
conferred on the union a unilateral right of withdrawal from the bar-
gaining unit." The court reasoned that this right in the union re-
sulted in an imbalance of power between the union and the employer
members of the unit sufficient to justify the court's granting to the
employer an equivalent right of unilateral withdrawal."
The effect of an impasse in multi-employer bargaining has
evolved into an area of conflict between the NLRB and the judiciary.
One of the causes of this conflict was the Board's initial inability to
formulate a consistent and well-reasoned doctrine regarding the effect
of such an impasse on bargaining obligations. This confusion prompt-
ed the circuit courts to act and establish an "impasse doctrine" 24
which is inconsistent with the doctrine finally developed by the
Board.25 The Beck case is significant in that it highlights this continu-
ing controversy between the Board and the circuit courts.
This casenote will examine some of the Board's early decisions
which created the confusion over multi-employer bargaining unit im-
" 213 N.L.R.B. at_, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1038-39.
" 213 N.L.R.B. at_, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1039.
"522 F.2(1 at 478-79 & n.8., 90 L.R.R.M. at 2091 & n.8.
"Id. at 479, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2091.
" N.L.R.A. § 10(e), 29 U.S.C.
	
160(e) (1970). 522 F.2d at 477, 90 L.R.R,M. at
2089-90.
" 522 F.2d at 483, 90 L.R.R1M. at 2094.
" Id. at 482-83, 90 L. R.R.M. at 2094.
22 Id. at 483, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2094.
" Id.
"The term "impasse doctrine" refers to the rules governing a party's withdrawal
from a multi-employer bargaining unit after a negotiating impasse has been reached. In
Television Artists Kansas City Local v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 67 L.R.R.M. 3032 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), the court accepted the Board's definition of impasse which was "that there
was no realistic possibility that continuation of discussion at that time would have been
fruitful." Id. at 628 & n.I7, 67 L.R.R.M. at 3036 & n.17.
is See text at notes 57-60 infra.
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passes and the later judicial responses to that confusion. Also, the
Board's decision in Hi-Way Billboards, Inc." which ultimately led to the
formulation of the Board's position on impasse will be examined. The
reasoning of the court in Beck will then be critically analyzed and the
impact of the court's holding assessed. Finally, the apparent conflict
between the circuit court approach and the labor policy embedded in
the Act will be discussed.
In its early decisions, the NLRB made no attempt to define the
limits of an employer's right to withdraw from a multi-employer bar-
gaining association." Indeed, in one early decision, the Board re-
marked that "employers [have] unlimited freedom unilaterally to fash-
ion the scope of, or to completely destroy multi-employer bargaining
units at their will or fancy." 28
 A similar, unfettered right to withdraw
was also recognized in the union once a bargaining impasse was
reached. 29
This hands-off approach of the early Board decisions was short-
lived, however. In Retail Associates the Board sought to establish stabil-
ity in multi-employer bargaining relationships" by setting up
guidelines for withdrawal from a multi-employer bargaining unit. In
Retail Associates, the, union withdrew from the multi-employer unit
after successfully initiating whipsaw tactics. 3 ' Pursuant to section 9 of
the Act," the employer association petitioned the Board for a hearing
2° 206 N.L.R.B. 22. 84 L.R.R.M. 1161 (1973), supplementing 191 N.L.R.B. 244,
77 L.R,R.M. 1961, enforcement denied, 500 F.2d 181, 87 L.R.R.M. 2203 (5th Cir. 1974).
22
 Association of Motion Picture Producers, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 1155, 25 L.R.R.M,
1448 (1950); Johnson Optical Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 539, 25 L.R.R.M. 1135 (1949).
28
 Morand Brothers Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 418, 26 L.R.R.M. 1501, 1507
(1950), enforced in , part and remanded in part, 190 F.2d 576, 28 L.R.R.M. 2364 (7th Cir.
1951). In Morand the employer bargaining association claimed that the union had vio-
lated sections 8(b)(1) and (3) of the Act by sending out individual contract proposals to
the association members, 91 N.L.R.B. at 415, 417, 26 L.R.R.M. at 1505, 1506. The as-
sociation argued unsuccessfully that these proposals constituted a withdrawal from the
multiemployer unit and thus represented a refusal to bargain collectively with the as-
sociation. Id. at 417, 26 L.R.R.M. at 1506.
" 91 N.L.R.B. at 418, 26 L.R.R.M. at 1506. This parity of rights argument, id.,
26 L.R.R.M. at 1507, was based on an inaccurate notion of the employer's rights. In
Morand the Board cited Johnson Optical Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 439, 25 L.R.R.M. 1135 (1949)
and Association of Motion Picture Producers, Inc„ 88 N.L.R.B. 1155, 25 L.R.R.M. 1448
(1950) as indicative of the unfettered employer right to unit determination at any time.
Id. at 418 & n.16, 26 L.R.R.M. at 1507 & n.16. However, neither of these cases dealt
with unit determination arising during negotiations. In Johnson, the Board granted the
employer's uncontested request to become a separate bargaining unit in a unit determi-
nation case in which no 8 violations were charged. 87 N.L.R.B. at 541-42, 25
L.R.R.M. at 1135-36. Motion Picture Producers was similarly a unit determination case
within the broader framework of an election challenge. 88 N.L.R.B. at 1161, 25
L.R.R.M. at 1450.
2 ° 120 N.L.R.B. at 393-94, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1120-21.
21 Id. at 390-91. "Whipsawing is the process of striking one at a time the em-
ployer members of a multi-employer association." N.L.R.B. v. Teamster Local 449 (Buf-
falo Linen), 353 U.S. 87, 90 n.7 (1957).
32
 NLRA 9(b), (c)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (13),'(c)(1)(B) (1970).
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to determine the proper bargaining unit." The Board decided the
case on the factual issue of whether the union had effectively re-
moved itself from the unit with a bare disclaimer of representation."
The Board held that the disclaimer did not justify the union's unilat-
eral withdrawal from the bargaining unit since the alleged disclaimer
was neither in good faith nor consistent with its subsequent conduct. 35
Guidelines were then established to govern withdrawal from multi-
employer bargaining. In setting up the guidelines, the Board included
an element of flexibility by allowing withdrawal after the start of
negotiations and without mutual consent in cases of "unusual
circumstances." 38 Since the Board did not define the scope of "un-
usual circumstances," the question of whether an impasse was to be
included in such a category, in light of earlier decisions, remained
unanswered. 37
This important question continued to remain unanswered as the
Board, in later decisions, implied that an impasse was not an "unusual
circumstance,"" only to later imply that it was such a circumstance."
120 N.L.R.B. at 388-89.
34 Id, at 391-92, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1120,
m Id. at 392-94, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1120-21.
a" We would accordingly refuse to perMit the withdrawal of an employer
or a union from duly established Muldemployer bargaining unit, ex-
cept upon adequate written notice given prior to the date set by the
contract for modification, or to the agreed-upon date to begin the
multiemployer negotiations. Where actual bargaining negotiations
based on the existing multiemployer unit have begun, we would not
permit except on mutual consent, an abandonment of the unit upon
which each side has committed itself to the other, absent unusual cir-
cumstances.
Id. at 395, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1121.
" In NLRB v. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc„ 500 F.2d 181, 87 L.R.R.M. 2203 (5th Cir.
1974), the Board argued that after Retail Associates, the decision in Morand was no
longer viable. hl. at 184, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2206. However, the court characterized this in-
terpretation of the effect of Retail Associates as "new," indicating that the case was nut
read by them as overruling Morand. Id.
''K Teamsters Local 717 (Ice Cream Council), 145 N.L.R.B. 865, 55 .L.R.R.M.
1059 (1964), The NLRB skirted the impasse issue in Ice Cream Council. One of the
charges against the union was that it had coerced certain employers into leaving the as-
sociation to bargain on an individual basis. See id. at 870, 55 L.R.R.M. at 1061. The
Board, noting that the employers had initiated the individual negotiations, discarded
the employers' argument and held that, lib) a situtation such as this, where there has
been a breakdown in negotiations leading to an impasse and a resultant strike, an em-
ployer, if he so chooses and the union agrees, is not precluded from voluntarily with-
drawing from a multiemployer unit." Id. This statement is ripe with negative connota-
tions as to whether an impasse alone justifies withdrawal. It would appear that the
Board was only applying the Retail Associates criteria that allows withdrawal during
negotiations with mutual consent. See Retail Associates, 1'20 N.L.R.B. at 395, 42 L.R.R.M.
at 1121.
3"
 Plumbers Local 323 (P.H.C. Mechanical Contractors), 191 N.L.R.B. 592, 77
L.R.R.M. 1769 (1971). In P.H.C. the Trial Examiner focused on the question of
whether or not an itnpasss existed, id. at 594.96, concluding that there was no basis to
the association's charge that the union had violated §13(b)(3) by entering into an interim
agreement with P.H.C. Id. at 596. "In view of our conclusions [that there was] an im-
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The confusion of these decisions indicates that as late as 1972 the
Board had not formulated a consistent impasse doctrine in the multi-
employer bargaining context.
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Fairmont Foods Co. v. NLRB," al-
though not persuasive, represents the beginnings of the type of
analysis that later circuit courts would apply in deciding the impasse
question. Respondent employer was charged with violating section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act in that it had refused to sign a contract
reached during multi-employer bargaining.'" Respondent denied its
obligation to sign, arguing that as a matter of law an impasse in
multi-employer bargaining permits withdrawal without consent. 42 Al-
ternatively, respondent contended that the union had given its
consent. 43
In its decision, the NLRB adopted the Trial Examiner's rulings,
findings, and conclusions. 44 The Examiner based his decision on a
factual determination of whether an impasse had existed. He found
that "Respondent's complaint ... while it reflected disagreement be-
tween the Respondent and the other members of the group was not
the kind of impasse or other 'special circumstances' which would
privilege the Respondent's otherwise untimely withdrawal from the
group bargaining."45
 The Board ordered Fairmont Foods Company
to sign the collective bargaining agreement.4 6 Fairmont refused, and
the Board sought enforcement of its order.'"
The circuit court denied enforcement" and, without analysis or
explanation, formulated an impasse doctrine: "When an impasse in
negotiations is reached, withdrawal by a member of a multi-employer
bargaining group is excused."'" Cited in support of this formulation
were two earlier Board decisions," one pre -Retail Associates and one
post-Retail Associates, which arguably reflect opposite Board positions
on the effect of impasse. 5 '
passe, further extended discussion is unnecessary." Id. Adopting the Trial Examiner's
findings, conclusions, and recommendations, id. at 592, the Board similarly noted: "As
we agree with the Trial Examiner that an impasse did exist prior to the commencement
of the separate negotiations between the Union and P.H.C. leading to the interim con-
tract, we need not consider ... the Trial Examiner's alternate conclusions ...." hi. at
592 n.l.
" 471 F.2c1.1170, 82 L.R.R.M. 2017 (8th Cir. 1972), denying enforcement of 196
•N.L.R.B. 849, 80 L.R.R.M. 1 172 (1972).
" Fairmont Foods Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 849, 850, 80 L.R.R.M. 1172, 1174 (1972).
42 1d. at 855, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1174.
"/d.
"M. at 849.
45 1d. at 846.
" Id. at 856, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
" 471 F.2d at 1171, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2017.
" Id. at 1173, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2019.
" Id. at 1172, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2018.
a° Id., 82 L.R.R.M. at 2018.19, citing Morand Brothers Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B.
409, 26 L.R.R.M. 1501 (1950), and Teamsters Local 717 (Ice Cream Council), 145
N.L.R.B. 865, 55 L.R.R.M. 1059 (1964).
"See text at notes 28-29 & note 38 supra.
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In Hi- Way Billboards, inc., 52 the. Board finally enunciated what
seemed to be a forceful and logical impasse doctrine. However, the
court, based on the Board's past decisions, rejected the Board's doc-
trine. Respondent employer was charged with violating sections 8(a)(5)
and (I) of the Act, stemming from a refusal to sign a multi-employer
bargaining agreement. 53 Respondent defended by asserting that it had
withdrawn from the association prior to the reaching of an agreement
and that such withdrawal was justified by a negotiating impasse. 54 The
Board held that no impasse had been reached and ordered the re-
spondent to sign the agreement. 55 In the ensuing enforcement action
the Fifth Circuit disputed this factual'determination, and after ruling
that an impasse had been reached, remanded the case to the Board
for a determination of the legal consequences of the impasse on the
parties' obligation to bargain in good faith."
On remand, the Board held that an impasse was not an "unusual
circumstance" within the meaning of Retail Associates." The Board
viewed an impasse as an expected part of negotiations which calls into
play the use of economic weapons by both sides in an attempt to re-
start the flow of negotiations." The Board logically noted that multi-
employer bargaining could, as a practical matter, be destroyed if
members of the unit were permitted to withdraw upon a bargaining
impasse, since a member could then avoid his bargaining obligations
by intentionally creating an impasse if an impending agreement was
unfavorable." The Board reaffirmed its original order directing the
employer to sign and implement the bargaining agreement."
The Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order."
The court agreed with the Board that only upon mutual consent or
unusual circumstances can an employer withdraw from a multi-
employer bargaining unit. 62
 However, the court parted company with
" 206 N.L.R.B. 22, 84 L.R.R.M. 1 161 (1973), supplementing 191 N.L.R.B. 244; 77
L.R.R.M. 1461, enforcement denied, 500 F.2d 181, 87 L.R.R.M. 2203 (5th Cir. 1974).
" See 191 N.L.R.B. at 246, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1463
54 Id. at 245, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1462.
" Id. at 245, 246, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1462, 1463.
" 473 F.2d 649, 655, 82 L.R.R.M. 2529, 2531.32 (5th Cir. 1973).
"206 N.L.R.B. at 23, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1163.
"Id., 84 L.R.R.M. at 1162.
" Were we to hold otherwise, we would be denying the practical reality of
collective-bargaining negotiations, we would herald the demise of
multi-employer bargaining, we would effectively negate the benefits of
such bargaining to all parties and to the employees, and we would
allow an employer to seize upon such an occurrence and use it as a
ground for withdrawal merely because it was dissatisfied with the im-
peding agreement, as Hi-Way did in the instant case. Consequently, we
hold that it would not effectuate the purpose or policies of the Act to
allow an employer member of such an association to withdraw solely on
the ground that an impasse in negotiations has been reached.
Id., 84 L.R.R.M. at 1163.
"Id., at 24, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1163.
61 500 F.2d 181, 184, 87 L.R.R.M. 2203, 2206 (5th Cir. 1974).
"id. at 182, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2204.
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the Board in apparently concluding that the existence of a bargaining
impasse constitutes an "unusual circumstance" which justifies unilat-
eral withdrawal from the bargaining unit." The court based its con-
clusion on considerations of fairness. In prior Board decisions" the
court discerned a Board-sanctioned, union right of withdrawal at
impasse." Since the Board had established a principle of applying the
Retail Associates criteria equally to both employers and unions," the
court held that an employer could also unilaterally withdraw from a
bargaining unit upon an impasse in negotiations."' The court's reason-
ing seems unpersuasive, particularly since it misread one of the deci-
sions claimed to establish the union's right to unilateral withdrawal."
Furthermore, the vitality of a second decision relied on for the same
proposition," in light of the confusion shown by the NLRB in subse-
quent decisions, seems an inadequate foundation for the court's
conclusion.'"
After the Board's formulation of its impasse doctrine in Hi-Way
Billboards, but prior to the Fifth Circuit's refusal to enforce the order
issued in that decision, the Board decided Beck Engraving Co." In its
initial consideration of the case, the Board held that none of the three
facts asserted by Beck constituted "unusual circumstances" justifying
withdrawal from the multi-employer bargaining unit." The Fifth Cir-
cuit subsequently rendered its decision in Hi-Way Billboards that a bar-
gaining impasse does justify withdrawal from the bargaining unit.
Beck then sought reconsideration by the Board of its decision based
on an impasse argument. Beck's motion for reconsideration was
prompted by the favorable Fifth Circuit decision in Hi-Way
Billboards." The Board denied the motion, however, and sought en-
63 See 500 F.2d at 182-84, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2204-06.
64 Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp Mfrs., 163 N.L.R.B. 892, 64 L.R.R.M. 1420 (1967);
Morand Brothers Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 26 L.R.R.M. 1501 (1950).
65 500 F.2d at 183-84, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2205.
°° See Evening News Ass'n, 154 N.L.R.B. 1494, 60 L.R.R.M. 1149 (1965), enforced
sub nom. Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 569, 572, 64 L.R.R.M.
2403, 2406 (6th Cir. 1967). On the issue of whether the union could withdraw from a
unit if it adhered to the Retail Associates criteria, the Board in Evening News . stated: "[W]e
believe that the existing rules governing employer withdrawal from multi-employer
units should be applied on an equal basis to union withdrawal from such units." 154
N.L.R.B. at 1501, 60 L.R.R.M. at 1152.
67 500 F.2d at 183-84, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2205-06.
44 The court cited Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp and Paper Mfrs., 163 N.L.R.B. 892,
64 L.R.R.M.,1420 (1967), for the proposition that the Board had, granted the union a
unilateral right to withdraw. 500 F.2d at 183, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2205. However, in Pacific
Coast, union withdrawal was allowed because titu€5 , notice, prior to the start of negotia-
tions, had been given. 163 N.L.R.B. at 896, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1423.
6° Morand Brothers Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 26 L.R.R.M. 1501 (1950).
74 See note 37 supra.
" 213 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 87 L.R.R.M. 1037 (1974). Beck was decided on August
26, 1974, id.; the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement in Hi-Way on September 11, 1974,
500 F.2d at 181, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2203.
72 213 N.L.R.B. at_, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1038; see text at note 15 supra.
73 Beck, 522 F.2d at 479 n.8, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2091 n.8.
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forcement of its order that Beck sign and give effect to the agreement
between the Association and the Union. 74
The Third Circuit was faced with a line of conflicting and con-
fusing Board decisions on the effect of impasse on withdrawal -and
several poorly reasoned circuit court decisions, including Fairmont
Foods and Hi- Way Billboards. The only reasonably lucid statement of
NLRB policy available to the Third . Circuit was the Board's Hi- Way
Billboards decision. Unfortunately, the court chose to ignore this clear
statement and to focus instead on the Board's past confusion. Conse-
quently, the court's decision perpetuates the confusion that has
characterized the impasse doctrine.
The Third Circuit initially noted the withdrawal rules set forth
by the Board in Retail Associates and stated that, "[s]ince Beck with-
drew unilaterally during contract negotiations, the issue presented us
is whether 'unusual circumstances' justified respondent's action." 75
 The
Board argued that this exception to the employer's bargaining obliga-
tions should be limited to situations of extreme financial hardship and
instances of near total unit fragmentation." The court, however,
would not accept these stringent limitations. Instead, the court
reasoned that past Board decisions created a situation of unequal
treatment of employers vis-"d-vis the union within the multi-employer
bargaining process.
The court noted an imbalance of economic weapons as the first
area of unequal treatment. Under the Act, the union is expressly given
74 See 522 F.2d at 478-79, 90 L.R.R.M.' at 2091. The Third Circuit's threshold
question in deciding the Beck case was whether the issue of impasse could be raised on
appeal since the issue was not argued before the Board. Controlling on this question
Was 29 U.S.C. 160(e) (1970), which provides in part: "No objection that has not been
argued before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the
court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of
extraordinary circumstances:" The court held that prior to the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Hi-Way, the impasse doctrine was in "embryonic form;" however, after that decision was
handed down, the impasse issue was promptly raised by Beck in a motion for reconsid-
eration. 522 F.2d at 479 n.8, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2091 n.8. The court therefore held that it
would be unfair to treat as a waiver the respondent's earlier failure to vocalize the issue.
Id.
The court was obviously eager to use this case as a vehicle for asserting its im-
passe doctrine. It is arguable that the court misread § 160(e) in order to consider the
impasse question. It seems likely that Morand Brothers Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409,
26 L.R.R.M. 1501 (1950), Teamsters Local 717 (Ice Cream Council), 145 N.L.R.B. 865,
55 L.R.R.M. 1059 (1964), Plumbers Local 323 (P.H.C. Mechanical Contractors), 191
N.L.R.B. 592, 77 L.R.R.M. 1.769 (1971), and Fairmont Foods contain sufficient discussion
of the impasse question to take Beck's omission out of the common understanding of
"extraordinary circumstances." Indeed, the ruling effectively changes the wording of
the statute from "extraordinary circumstances" to "ordinary circumstances." This
change weakens the Board's power of original review by opening the door wide to ar-
gument of new issues at the enforcement proceedings as long as there is a related, in-
tervening decision in some other court.
" 522 F.2d at 481, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2093.
79
 Id.
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a statutory right to strike." The strike is an economic weapon which
is used by a union to exert pressure on an employer or employers in
an effort to force capitulation in negotiations. The Act does not, how-
ever, expressly create a corresponding defensive right in the employer
which he may utilize if the union calls a strike. This statutory imbal-
ance was magnified by early decisions of the Board" and the courts."
In NLRB v. Teamster Local 449 (Buffalo Linen), 80 however, the Supreme
Court corrected this imbalance by upholding a Board ruling that, ab-
sent an independent showing of antiunion animus, non-struck em-
ployers in a bargaining association could temporarily lock out their
union employees as a defensive measure against a selective strike in
order to protect the integrity of the bargaining unit." As the Board
had noted in the initial action, the bargaining unit is threatened by a
selective strike because "EtThe calculated purpose of maintaining a
strike against one employer and threatening to strike others in the
employer group at future times is to cause successive and individual
employer capitulations."82
 Thus, to counteract this threat to multi-
employer bargaining vitality occasioned by the union's statutory right
to strike, the Court implied a right in the non-struck employers of the
bargaining association to lock out their own union employees."
The Third Circuit in Beck apparently incorrectly gleaned from
Buffalo Linen the rule that an imbalance of economic weapons in favor
of the union requires, as a judicial response, the implication of a cor-
responding deferisive right in the employer." The court found that a
"See NLRA 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), held:
Section 7 guarantees, and 8(a)(1) protects from employer interfer-
ence the rights of employees to engage in concerted activities, which, as
Congress has indicated, includes the right to strike. ... Section 13 makes
clear that although the strike weapon is not an unqualified right, nothing
in the Act except as specifically provided is to be construed to interfere
with this means of redress .... This repeated solicitude for the right to
strike is predicated upon the conclusion that a strike when legitiniately
employed is an economic weapon which in great measure implements and
supports the principles of the collective bargaining system.
Id. at 233-34 (citations omitted).
.	 " Carter Carburetor Corp. v. NLRB, 140 F.2d 714, 14 L.R.R.M. 512 (8th Cir.
1944), enforcing 48 N.L.R.B. 354, 11 L.R.R.M. 701 (1943); NLRB v. Barrett Co., 135
F.2d 959, 12 L.R.R.M. 768 (7th Cir. 1943), enforcing 41 N.L.R.B. 1327, 10 L.R.R.M. 161
(1942); Moanalua Dairy, Ltd., 65 N.L.R.B. 714, 17 L.R.R.M. 252 (1946).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Star Publishing Co., 97 F.2d 465, 2 L.R.R.M. 762 (9th Cir.
1938), The Ninth Circuit, responding to an "economic exigencies" argument by the
employer, held: "It [the Act] permits no immunity because the employer may think that
the exigencies of the moment require infraction of the statute. In fact, nothing in the
statute permits or justifies its violation by the employer. Id. at 470, 2 L.R.R.M. at 767.
°D 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
°' Id. at 97.
" 2
 Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447, 448, 34 L.R.R.M. 1355, 1356
(1954). Such union activity is termed "whipsawing." See note 31 supra.
43 353 U.S. at 89, 97.
a' See 522 F.2d at 482, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2094.
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second weapon had been given to the union by the Board's decisions
in P.H.C. Mechanical Contractors" and Sangamo Construction Co.: 8° "[I]t
[the Board] has given its imprimatur to the union's negotiation of in-
terim, separate agreements with individual members of the multi-
employer bargaining unit." 87 HoweVer, the court found no corres-
ponding right in the employer to counterbalance this right created by
the Board in the union." The court therefore reasoned, apparently
from its understanding of the Buffalo Linen holding, that the bare
existence 89 of this second weapon justified an equivalent employer
right to withdraw at impasse:
The union, under the Board's own policy should not have
been given two weapons for its economic arsenal (i.e., the
selective strike and individual negotiations) while the em-
ployers are given only one (viz., the lockout). We believe
that the Board's approval of individual, interim agreements
during multi-employer bargaining and without requiring
withdrawal from the multi-employer bargaining unit is suf-
ficient cause for according the employer an equivalent
right."
The second area of unequal treatment, created by the Board, was
based on the existence of unequal withdrawal rights for the employer
and the union. The court cited several Board decisions" to emphasize
that "the Board has enunciated the even-handed principle that its
regulations for withdrawal from multi-employer bargaining units are
the same for the unions and the employers."" The court then cited
the decisions in Sangamo and P.H.C. as indicative of the Board's ap-
proval of union withdrawal at impasse." Applying these decisions and
the policies of the Board, the court concluded that a "negotiating im-
passe justifies unilateral withdrawal from a multi-employer bargaining
unit."94 Although the court spoke in terms of the Retail Associates
85 191 N.L.R.B. 592, 77 L.R.R.M. 1769 (1971).
" 188 N.L.R.B. 159, 77 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1971).
87 Beck, 522 F.2d at 482, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2094.
"Id. at 483, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2094.
" "The employer's right to withdraw during a bargaining impasse cannot he
made contingent upon the union's exercise of its right to negotiate individual interim
agreements. The rights of the parties should accrue simultaneously based upon the oc-
currence of an event which neither can manipulate (e.g., impasse)." Id. at 483, 90
L.R.R.M. at 2095.
"Id., 90 L.R.R.M. at 2094 (emphasis omitted).
" Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp and Paper Mfrs., 163 N.L.R.B. 892, 64 L.R.R.M.
1420 (1967); Evening News Ass'n, 154 N.L.R.B. 1494, 60 L.R.R.M. 1149 (1965),
enforced sub nom. Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 372 F.2d 569, 572, 64
L.R.R.M. 2403, 2406 (fith Cir. 1967).
" 522 F.2d at 482, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2094.
83 Id. "Moreover, allowing individual negotiations even on an interim basis is tan-
tamount to a rejection of the existence of the multi-employer bargaining unit." Id. at
483, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2094.
" Id.
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criteria when it spoke of "unusual circumstances,"" it is dear that the
court believed that both it and the Board had moved beyond the
Retail Associates guidelines."
It is submitted, first, that the Third Circuit's balancing analysis
in Beck is inconsistent with applicable Supreme Court decisions and
fundamental labor policy, and second, that the court's finding of a
Board-sanctioned, union right of unilateral withdrawal from a multi-
employer unit at impasse is erroneous. The court's balancing analysis
is in conflict with, the Supreme Court's post-Buffalo Linen decision in
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union." In Insurance Agents, the
union was charged with violating section 8(b)(3) of the Act: 98 "refusal
to bargain collectively with the employer." 90 The charge stemmed
from the union's use of harassing activities during negotiations."°
The Board held that such tactics were inconsistent with good faith
bargaining as defined by section 8(d) of the Act"' and issued a cease
and desist order.'" The District of Columbia Circuit denied enforce-
ment, holding'°3 that'it would not overrule its earlier decision that the
use of economic force was in no way inconsistent with a good faith
desire to reach an agreement.'"
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals, similarly finding no inconsistency between the application of a
maximum amount of economic pressure and the. obligation to bargain
in good faith.'" Rather, the Court feared that under the guise of en-
forcing the good faith bargaining obligation, the Board would regu-
late the use of economic weapons in such a manner as to influence
substantially the substantive terms of the contract. 10" "Our labor policy
is not presently erected on a foundation of governmental control of
93 Id. at 481, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2093.
"See id. at 484 n.15, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2095 n.15:
We reiterate that many of the ultimate policy judgments in this area
should be made by the Board because of its expertise. We merely seek to
redress an imbalance created by the Board's decisions and recognize that
we cannot and should not dictate to the Board the manner in which the
balance should be achieved. In this regard, the Board may well decide that
the impasse doctrine and the right of the union to negotiate individual, in-
terim agreements form part of a less desirable equilibrium than a return
to the Retail Associates rule.
" 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
"See 119 N.L.R.B. at 769, 41 L.R.R.M. at 1178.
" See NLRA 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970).
" 0 119 N.L.R.B. at 769, 41 L.R.R.M. at 1177.
" 1 NLRA 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) defines the duty to bargain as "the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment."
'° 119 N.L.R.B, at 774, 41 L.R.R.M. at 1178.
"" 260 F.2d 736, 736, 43 L.R.R.M, 2003, 2003 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
I" Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 409, 410, 36 L.R.R.M. 2778, 2779
(D.C. Cir. 1955).
105 361 U.S. at 494-96.
'"Id. at 497-98.
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the results of negotiations. Nor does it contain a charter for the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board to act at large in equalizing disparities
of bargaining power between employer and union."'"
There seems little doubt that this policy of non-interference into
the use of economic sanctions to influence the bargaining process ap-
plies beyond Board decisions to judicial actions, for the Court in
Insurance Agents placed the restriction on "any governmental power." 198
Furthermore, even though the Court in Insurance Agents was not rul-
ing on activities within a multi-employer situation, the Supreme Court
in NLRB v. Brown 1 " 9 applied the same limitations to a multi-employer
situation.'"
Insurance Agents and Brown reflect a Supreme Court policy of de-
termining the legitimacy of a bargaining tactic isolated from any no-
tion of relative bargaining strength. Specifically, the Court determined
that the Board cannot deny the existence of an economic right on the
basis of relative bargaining power. The same principle should be
equally applicable where the Board, or a court, acts to grant an
economic right. These determinations should be made solely on the
basis of the pertinent statutory standard; they should not be based on
an assessment of relative bargaining strength. The Third Circuit in
Beck violated this policy when it granted withdrawal rights based not
on a thoughtful analysis of the Act, but rather on an assessment of
the parties' relative bargaining position. This form of balancing im-
properly affects the substantive terms of the ultimate collective bar-
gaining agreement, an effect denounced in Insurance Agents."'
Even if the Third Circuit's balancing analysis were proper, its in-
accurate view of the economic weapons available to each party would
make the analysis in Beck unpersuasive. To achieve a proper balance
between the bargaining weapons available, it is necessary to consider
all the weapons available, not just the three mentioned by the court. It
has already been noted that, to a certain extent, union harassing
tactics while on the job are allowed. 12 The Supreme Court has also
allowed the struck members of a multi-employer unit to lock out their
union employees and hire temporary replacements," 2 the non-struck
1117 Id, at 490 (citation omitted).
1 "" Id. at 488.
1 "" 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
"1" Id, at 283, The lion-struck members of a bargaining association were charged
with violating § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act stemming from the lock-out of their union
people and the hiring of temporary replacements. Id. at 279-80. The Board upheld
these charges. However, the Court of' AppealS denied enforcement. Id. at 280. The
Supreme Court began their affirmance by postulating, "[w]e begin with the proposition
that the Act does not constitute the Board as an 'arbiter of the sort of economic
weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain acceptance of their bargaining
demands.' " Id. at 283, quoting Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 497. Thus, the Court in
Brown made its decision based on the limits on Board power established in insurance
Agents.
"' 361 U.S. at 497-98.
" 3 Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 490-92. •
13 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.. 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938),
537
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
members to lock out their union people and hire temporary replace-
ments," 4 and all association members to use the lockout offensively
when no selective strike has occurred." 5 This incomplete list 116 of
sanctioned weapons adequately demonstrates that the balancing done
by the Third Circuit is questionable and imprecise.
The Third Circuit's finding of Board approval for union unilat-
eral withdrawal from a multi-employer unit at impasse, based on the
Board's holdings in Sangamo and P.H.C.," 7 does not seem ultimately
acceptable in light of the more recent Board decision in Hi-Way Bill-
boards and the congressional policy embedded in the Act. Indeed,
Sangamo does not stand for the proposition that a union may with-
draw from the bargaining unit as to some employers at an impasse.
Sangamo was charged with violating section 8(a)(5), and the union,
section 8(b)(3) of the Act stemming from their entering into an in-
terim agreement during an association-wide strike." 5 Sangamo in-
itiated the negotiations which led to the interim agreement.'" In the
Board's decision there was no finding of an impasse. 12° Furthermore,
the Board expressly stated that "there is no contention that the in-
terim agreement was a contract covering a separate bargaining
unit. "121 The interim agreement represented a type of reverse selec-
tive strike. The terms of the agreement called for a continuation of
the prior pay scale, continued multi-employer bargaining, and re-
troactive pay after agreement was reached.' 22 Other than the retroac-
tive pay provision, this•contract merely represented a situation identi-
cal to the one which would have existed had the union struck every
employer but Sangamo. The Board could thus find no attempt on the
part of the union to fragment the bargaining unit by whipsawing the
members. 123
 For these reasons, Sangamo does not support the Third
Circuit's conclusions. •
P.H.C., on the other hand, does support the Third Circuit's con-
clusions. The union was charged with violating section 8(b)(3) as a re-
sult of its .entering into an interim agreement with P.H.C. 124 The
Board, in dismissing the charge,' 25 suggested that the existence of an
impasse justifies the union's withdrawal from the multi-employer bar-
"' Brown, 380 U.S. at 283.
"8 American Shipbldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965).
"' See Brown, 380 U.S. at 283: "Even the Board concedes that an employer may
legitimately blunt the effectiveness of an anticipated strike by stockpiling inventories,
readjusting contract schedules, or transferring work from one plant to another even if
he thereby makes himself 'virtually strikeproor "
'" See text at notes 92-94 supra.
18 188 N.L.R.B. at 159-60, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1039-40.
"5 Id., 77 L.R.R.M. at 1040.
12° Id. at 160, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1041.
' 2 ' Id., 77 L.R.R.M. at 1040.
" 2 /d.
' 23 1d., 77 L.R.R.M. at 1041.
184
 191 N.L.R.B. at 596.
128 Id. at 592, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1770.
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gaining context and negotiation of individual interim agreements.'"
As was noted earlier, the Trial Examiner's ruling in Fairmont Foods Co.
indicated that he believed that an impasse was an unusual circum-
stance sufficient,to justify withdrawal by the employer under the Retail
Associates guidelines.'" It thus seems that at the time P.H.C. was de-
cided, the Board itself felt that either the employers or the union
could withdraw at impasse.'" However, since the court in Beck
evidenced a concern with reaching a result consistent with the Board's
decisions and policies, it is curious that the court did not consider and
apply the Board's decision in Hi- Way Billboards. 12" In Hi- Way Bill-
boards, the Board formulated a well-reasoned impasse doctrine: Im-
passe is not an "unusual circumstance" and should not serve as an ex-
cuse for fragmenting and destabilizing multi-employer bargaining. 13 "
While the Fifth Circuit did deny enforcement in Hi- Way Billboards, it
nevertheless seems doubtful that, as the Third Circuit concluded in
Beek, the "Board's own policy" at the time of the Beck decision permit-
ted union withdrawal at impasse.' 3 ' The Board's holding in Hi- Way
Billboards is clearly contrary to such a conclusion.
The court's decision in Beck also unnecessarily weakens multi-
employer bargaining and conflicts with congressional policy. The
court itself realized the effect of its holding in these areas: "[Me can-
not avoid the conclusion that this additional incremental instability,
however unfavorable to the policy aimed at stabilization of these units,
is a necessary concomitant of insuring that the parties have equal
rights and that the existence and implementation of such rights do
not grant unfair advantage to either party." 132 Stability and vitality
within the multi-employer bargaining context cannot exist, however,
where an employer can create an impasse and subsequently withdraw
from the unit whenever the terms of the proposed agreement seem
unfavorable.'" In such a situation the employers enjoy the benefits of
1 " See note 39.supra.
121 See text at notes 44-46 supra.
"" See note 39 supra.
1Y5 See text at notes 57-60 supra.
1 " See note 59 supra & accompanying text.
131 In its brief in Beck, the Board argued that impasse does not constitute an
"unusual circumstance" and thus does not justify withdrawal from a multi-employer
unit. Brief for Petitioner at 11-12. In so arguing, the Board claimed that Morand
Brothers Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R,B. 409, 26 L.R.R.M.' 1501 (1950), is no longer good
law, implying that they would no longer allow union withdrawal at impasse. Id. at
12-13.
132 522 F.2d at 484, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2095.
132 In cases following Beck, the withdrawing party will probably be required to
show that the terms it sought in the negotiations were presented in good faith and not
merely sought in order to create a deadlock. It is suggested, however, that such a test is
unworkable because of the inherent problems in proving a party's motive and intent.
See generally Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor
Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YAI,P: L.J. 1'269 (1968).
339
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
association bargaining without incurring any of its responsibilities.'"
Stability in the bargaining relationship has been recognized as central
to the national labor policy for many years,'" and the importance of
this consideration to the issue of unilateral withdrawal from multi-
employer bargaining units cannot be ignored. As the Sixth Circuit
stated in Detroit Newspaper Publishers' Association v. NLRB: 1 "
Thus, while fear of being "locked in" a unit might dis-
courage entrance by a union as the Board has argued, it
must be equally clear that a virtually unfettered right of
withdrawal, even if available to both sides in parity, might
also destroy the attractiveness of such arrangements. The
Board might well find that the instability resulting from
such conditions had undermined the multi-employer unit
as an effective tool of labor relations.'"
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have stressed the impor-
tance of stability in multi-employer bargaining. Congressional support
for multi-employer units surfaced during the Taft-Hartley Amend-
ments debate,'" and the preservation of bargaining unit stability was
the basis for the Supreme" Court's sanction of employer lockouts in
Buffalo Linen.'" It is submitted that the court in Beck failed to give
proper weight to this policy. Moreover, it ignored a Board
ruling--M-Way Billboards—which it could have applied to arrive at a
decision consistent with the concern for multi-employer bargaining
unit stability. Based on these infirmities, it appears that the Third
Circuit has simply perpetuated the confusion which has historically
surrounded the impasse doctrine. The Board must now wait until
another interim agreement case arises before it may "effectuate na-
tional labor policy" in the area of the impasse doctrine.
CONCLUSION
After Beck, the role of impasse in multi-employer bargaining re-
mains unclear, the product of many years of confusing and conflicting
decisions. Consequently, the vitality of the multi-employer unit as "an
" 4
 The employer presumably will withdraw only if he can negotiate a more
favorable agreement as a single-employer unit.
13S See Buffalo Linen, 353 U.S. at 95.
155 372 F.2d 569, 64 L.R.R.M. 2403 (6th Cir. 1967).
1 P Id, at 572, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2406.
135 93 Cong. Rec. 4030-4031 (1947) (remarks of Senator Murray):
Because numerous employers are covered by a single collective-bargaining
agreement, less time is lost in the bargaining process. Settlements are
made simultaneously for these employers rather than on an individual
employer-by-employer basis. industrial peace is achieved in one step
rather than over a prolonged period of time. Bargaining with hundreds of
individual firms for the same things is both wasteful and unfair to both
sides.
" See 353 U.S. at 95-97.
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effective tool of labor relations" is in doubt. Having uncovered the
weaknesses in the other circuit court impasse doctrine decisions,"° the
Third Circuit was in a position to lead the courts and the Board back
to an impasse doctrine which would have given due consideration to
the policy of stability in bargaining relationships. However, in joining
the other circuits which allow unilateral withdrawal by the employer
in an impasse situation, the court has merely beclouded the area
further. The gap between the Board and the courts has been wid-
ened, and until a consistent resolution of the withdrawal issue is
reached in both forums, the future of multi-employer bargaining is
suspended in an uncertain state.
GABRIEL 0. DUMONT
'" See 522 F.2d at 483 n.13, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2099 n.13.
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